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Breaking Bioethics

Disease Genes Are Not Patentable:
A Rebuttal of McGee
JON F. MERZ and MILDRED K. CHO

Dr. McGee presents a cogent argument for the patentability of the diagnosis of gene forms that are found to
be associated with disease or other phenotypic manifestations. We’re convinced he’s wrong. An analogy will
help explain why.
Some years ago, in the Black Forest,
people hunted down the elusive truffle,
that culinary delight, with pigs learned
in the art of rooting around in, you
guessed it, tree roots. People and pigs
had been collaborating in the search
for truffles for thousands of years.
Among the truffles collected in the forest, none was as highly prized — or as
rare — as the White Truffle. It would
reward its finder with 10 times the price
of other truffles at market. But the
White Truffle was much more elusive
than other truffles, and a day in the
forest would yield an average 1 White
Truffle for every 100 regular truffles.
After 20 years of truffle trifles (and
meticulous notekeeping), one Franz
Statistiner did make an interesting (and,
as we shall see, valuable) observation:
9 of every 10 White Truffles that he
had gathered over the years were found
on the roots of red oak trees, and, overall, 20% of truffles found on red oaks
were White!
Franz contemplated keeping his finding secret and simply targeting his pigs
on their daily jaunts to search only red
oaks, thereby increasing his yield of
White Truffles. He was worried, however, that other truffle hunters would

soon note his success in the market
and figure out his secret. Instead, he
went to a patent lawyer.
A good patent lawyer. She wrote and
got an imaginary patent with the following claims:
I Claim:
1. A method of detecting an increased
chance of having White Truffles
under a tree comprising directly or
indirectly:
detecting whether or not a tree
is a Red Oak Tree;
and
observing whether or not the
tree is more likely to have White
Truffles growing under it, wherein
Red Oak Trees have an increased
likelihood of having White Truffles thereunder.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein
said detecting step comprises looking for trees having at least one
Red Oak Tree Leaf growing thereon.

Franz then was able to collect royalties from all other hunters who focused
their search on red oak trees, making
him wildly wealthy. Franz bought the
forest.
Sound reasonable? Dr. McGee apparently agrees with us: neither the discovery nor the act of looking at red
oak trees for the purpose of diagnosing the increased likelihood of finding
White Truffles is patentable subject mat-
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ter. What has been discovered is a mere
phenomenon of nature, an (as yet
unexplained) association between an
observation of a particular type of tree
in the forest and the empirical fact that
such trees have a “natural” propensity
for White Truffles. It is no more than
an observation of a thing and the mental step of understanding the informational value of that thing.
The truffle patent is not only analogous to a disease gene patent, but has
been craftily drafted directly from U.S.
Patent No. 5,508,167, entitled Methods
of Screening for Alzheimer’s Disease,
which reads:
What is claimed is:
1. A method of detecting if a subject
is at increased risk of developing
late onset Alzheimer’s disease (AD)
comprising directly or indirectly:
detecting the presence or absence
or an apolipoprotein E type 4 isoform (ApoE4) in the subject;
and
observing whether or not the
subject is at increased risk of developing late onset AD by observing if the presence of ApoE4
is or is not detected, wherein the
presence of ApoE4 indicates said
subject is at increased risk of developing late onset AD.

This invention, Dr. McGee and the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office agree, is
patentable. What differs? The act of “detecting” in the truffle patent requires
one’s eyes and knowledge of any unique
characteristics of the red oak tree, such
as the leaf specified in claim 2. Detecting in the AD patent requires use of PCR,
Southern analysis, sequencing, or one of
numerous other previously established
means of looking at the chemical structure known as DNA. Each entails steps
that are obvious to anyone skilled in the
pertinent art. The act of looking at trees
or genes, respectively, comprises nor426

mal knowledge and skill of those trained
in their respective arts. Any one device
or method for looking might itself be a
patentable innovation (such as a microscope, telescope, or PCR), but the special protections afforded by patenting
should not be extended to all specific
acts of looking.
What else differs? The “invention” underlying the truffle patent is the association of red oak trees with an increased
chance of finding White Truffles thereunder. The “invention” underlying the
AD patent is the association of a particular allele with an increased chance
of disease occurrence. Both are empirical observations; both are simply epidemiologic discoveries about (albeit
within our current understanding of)
naturally occurring phenomena.
Dr. McGee’s argument is based on
two false premises. The first is that the
difficulty and effort involved in making a discovery, the “immensely difficult epidemiological task of purifying
otherwise diffuse relationships between
particular environments and genes, and
between particular groups and genes,”
make the discovery patentable.
Everyone agrees that a basic scientific or statistical discovery, regardless
of how difficult it was to make or how
much effort and money went into it, is
not patentable subject matter. As the
U.S. Supreme Court stated in a case in
which it invalidated claims for a mixture of bacteria, “[P]atents cannot issue
for the discovery of the phenomena of
nature. . . . The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part
of the storehouse of knowledge of all
men. They are manifestations of laws
of nature, free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none.” 1 The Supreme
Court more recently reiterated that
“[t]he laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been
held not patentable. . . . Thus a new
mineral discovered in the earth or a
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new plant found in the wild is not
patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated
law that E 5 mc2 ; nor could Newton
have patented the law of gravity.” 2 The
work Einstein and Newton put into
these discoveries was synthetic and
novel, but their genius and remarkable efforts do not make their observations of associations between physical
entities patentable.
Furthermore, the fact that several
research groups independently clone
and sequence genes associated with diseases, often within weeks of each other,
suggests that the effort is not that
innovative to those skilled in the arts.
If the entire coding sequence of the
human genome is sequenced at the end
of the Human Genome Project, it will
become even less of an effort to correlate the presence of sequences with disease. At some point, by Dr. McGee’s
argument, associations between genes
and diseases will not be patentable
because of the ease — a simple computer search — of finding these (as well
as far more complex multigene and
gene-environment) relationships. To say
that these associations are patentable
is “genetic exceptionalism”: allowing
oneself to be unduly dazzled, nay, mesmerized, by the novelty of biotechnology compared to other technologies. It
is genetic exceptionalism to say that
finding associations between red oak
trees and White Truffles using the wellestablished method of shoveling is not
patentable, but that finding associations between a gene and a disease
using well-established methods of mapping, cloning, and sequencing genes,
and of identifying people with mutations is patentable.
Dr. McGee’s second false premise is
that he predicates patentability on the
usefulness of the discovery. However,
market potential is not a necessary,
much less a satisfactory, condition to
determining whether something com-

prises patentable subject matter. It is
simply irrelevant. Gold and diamonds,
while valuable, are not patentable subject matter, regardless of who first discovered them or how difficult those
discoveries were. McGee’s arguments
show how easy it is to segue from an
inquiry about whether something is
patentable subject matter to questions
about whether that something satisfies the tests for patentability; that is,
it must be new, useful, and nonobvious. Under U.S. patent law, however,
these are separate issues, and confounding them muddles the underlying
question.
Arguing that correlating discoveries with “human life for the purpose
of creating a diagnostic process is innovation” as does McGee sets us on a
slippery slope that would wreak havoc
with healthcare. By this argument, tests
used in performing physical examinations (including asking patients questions, feeling their thyroid glands, and
listening to their lungs and heart with
stethoscopes) as methods of detecting
abnormalities should be patentable.
Many of the methods used in routine physicals took years of clinical
observations and effort, resulted from
a synthetic and creative process, and
are undoubtedly useful. Yet are they
patentable?
At bottom, the “detection” involved
in the truffle and disease gene patents
itself is not patentable. Everyone is free
to look at those things — be they trees
or genes —that exist independent of the
ingenuity, innovation, and manufacture of humans. The fact that someone
discovers a reason for looking does not
change that basic premise. The scientific reason itself is not patentable, and
it does not render the act of looking in
the specific case patentable.
Independent of the foregoing, we
believe there are substantive arguments against disease gene patenting
based not on patentability of the sub–
427
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ject matter but on public policy and
ethics. As we have asserted elsewhere,
the risks to patient health and access
to care, to physician-patient relations,
and to the biomedical research enterprise far outweigh the possible benefits that could be attributed to disease
gene patents. 3 While we believe the
courts should invalidate these broad
diagnosis methods patents under the
product of nature doctrine, we firmly
believe that the unethical patenting
practices reflected in these patents
should be more firmly enjoined by the
medical profession and by healthcare
institutions. Unfortunately, the ethical
proscriptions have been emasculated
by financial pressures, by increasing
commercialism of academic medicine,
and by profiteering. The profession
must clean up its act, or Congress may
intervene.
Because of perceived abuse of patents of surgical methods, Congress
enacted a law in late 1996 that holds
physicians not liable for infringement
of “pure process” patents. 4 That law
does not apply to “biotechnology patents” (perhaps reflecting Congress’s
love affair with things biotechnic, and
perhaps reflecting the acknowledged
assistance of the biotechnology industry in drafting the law), 5 and does not
protect laboratories approved under the
Clinical Laboratories Improvement
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Act. 6 That law was a stopgap against
more drastic legislation prohibiting
medical process patents; if methods patenting continues to burgeon (and diagnostics comprises the largest share of
biotechnology patents being issued), 7
Congress should expand the law’s protections. Already, the human chorionic
gonadotropin patent, a similarly broad
diagnostic patent, has led to the abandonment of prenatal testing that had
been the standard of care. 8 This is simply unacceptable. These patents are
contrary to good medical practice, and
must be prohibited.
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